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This report was partially funded by a grant from Association of Humanitarian Lawyers.

Humanitarian Law Project/International Educational Development, Inc. (HLP/IED) is a non-sectarian, non-governmental organization granted consultative status at the United Nations by Dag Hammarskjöld. IED, originally founded by Jesuit brothers to assist hospitals and schools in developing countries, merged in 1989 with Los Angeles-based HLP and broadened its scope to advocate and promote world-wide compliance with humanitarian and human rights law.

The Parliamentary Human Rights Group was founded in 1976 as an independent forum in the British Parliament concerned with the defense of international human rights. It now has over 100 members from all parties in both Houses of Parliament. The group undertakes human rights missions, publishes discussion papers, receives visitors and engages in dialogue with the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and with international bodies to which the UK belongs. The chair is Ann Clwyd MP.

Karen Parker specialises in human rights and humanitarian law. She is HLP/IED chief delegate to the United Nations. Anne Heindel works with HLP/IED on issues of humanitarian law and self-determination. Adam Branch is a graduate student in Political Science at Columbia University.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained by contacting:

Law Offices of Karen Parker

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San Francisco, California 94118

tel/fax (415) 668-2752.

Lord Avebury

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House of Lords,

London SW1P 0PW

tel +44171 274 4617

fax +44171 738 7864

email 104125.1657@compuserve.com

Arabic copies of the 1997 report may be obtained from

Universite d’Oran

Chaire de l’UNESCO pour l’Enseignement, la Recherche et

l’Education aux Droits de l’Homme, a la Democracie et a la Paix

B.P. 05 Es Senia Oran ALGERIA

tel/fax 213-6-34-63-98 or 213-6-41-96-51

1998 witnessed a new international war, between Eritrea and Ethiopia; an escalation of the civil war in Republic of Congo; the eruption of a new civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe on the side of President Kabila, with Uganda and Rwanda supporting the rebels; disintegration of the fragile peace in Angola; intensification of the fighting in Sudan, leading to humanitarian crises in Bahr el Ghazal and the Nuba Mountains; a major offensive by the rebels in Sierra Leone, and continued slaughter of non-combatants in Algeria. Africa has had to endure the scourge of conflict more intensively than other continents. The fighting has been conducted with particular brutality in Sierra Leone, where the rebels randomly hacked off the limbs of civilians in their path, and the ‘peacekeeping forces’ and their local allies executed suspected rebels without judicial process. The prospects for a negotiated settlement appear dim, as the Nigerians prepare to withdraw following their transition to civilian government - one of the few bright spots on the landscape.

Africa has only weak and ineffective conflict resolution mechanisms, and as noted last year, the sub-regional mechanisms are hobbled by the rivalries of their member states. South Africa’s initial attempt to prevent outside involvement in the DRC was unsuccessful, and the current mediator, President Chiluba of Zambia, is handicapped by Angolan suspicion that Zambia is giving UNITA some military help. In Sudan, the spasmodic IGAD initiatives have come to a halt since war broke out between two of its member states.

In Europe, by contrast, there are plenty of supranational organisations with some conflict resolution capacity, ranging from the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities who works only in situations not involving violence, through the European Union, the Russian-led CIS and NATO to the OSCE’s Chairman in Office. Yet when it comes to the crunch, as in Kosovo, all these sophisticated institutions plus the US cannot be said to have been more successful than their African counterparts. The Serbian attacks on civilians have continued under the noses of foreign observers, and President Milosevic has sent additional armour and artillery into the territory in breach of the tattered peace agreement he reluctantly signed. The continuation of the 15-year civil war between the Turkish state and the Kurdish-populated southeast region, unnoticed by any of the regional peacemaking authorities, also demonstrates that if an OSCE state of any consequence decides to boycott the available mechanisms, there is no way of bringing it to book. Sanctions can be invoked against little Serbia, and military force threatened if they carry on with attacks on civilians in Kosovo; but when the Turks commit war crimes against Kurds, the international community describes the resistance as terrorists. We need to develop a more consistent taxonomy of armed oppositions, and to apply theories of the just war, jus ad bellum, to internal conflicts.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the big question is whether Indonesia will manage the transition to greater democracy and freedom without more and worse violence. Since the downfall of Suharto, they have come to terms politically with the possibility of East Timor’s independence, but the irresponsible creation of a pro-integration militia undermines the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to solve the question peacefully. Acheh and West Papua, both incorporated into Indonesia contrary to UN principles, are demanding a hearing on the world stage.

Most of these conflicts and potential conflicts stem from the UN’s failure to decide what groups qualify as a ‘people’, able to exercise the right of self-determination. The incompatibility between the principle of teritorial integrity and that of self-determination was left unresolved, and there was no attempt to create a tribunal to deal with individual cases. Instead, it was left to ‘state practice’. If a people managed to assert their right by superior military force, as in Bangladesh or Eritrea, they were accepted as having qualified. That was not a good recipe for world peace.

We are also pleased that the Universite d’Oran, under the auspices of the Prof. Mustapha Mehedi, has issued an Arabic edition of our 1997 review. Professor Mehedi is the honouree of the UNESCO Chair for Teaching and Research and Education for Human Rights, Democracy and Peace.

As in past years’ reports, we provide a statement categorising the type of conflict involved, a background of the events leading up the situation today, the current situation, and the relevant action, if any, by the United Nations. We also provide a list of countries whose armed conflicts have been resolved or that have significant social violence which we do not consider to have risen to the level of an "armed conflict" under international law criteria. For those countries we have noted any UN or regional action taken, but have provided only a few exceptionally important citations. We conclude with a list of countries where there are current UN Peace-Keeping missions, an Appendix with the most important instruments of humanitarian law and a bibliography.

While we have tried to include all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, inclusion of resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is limited to those adopted after 1990 except when earlier resolutions are especially relevant. Citations to reports of the Secretary-General and the various reports of the rapporteurs are similarly limited in scope as are Chairman’s Statements of the Security Council (documents in the S/PRST series). Reports of treaty bodies, reports of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), provisional reports of rapporteurs to the General Assembly, resolutions of the Economic and Social Council (included in past years) and letters and notes verbale are not included.

We classify the armed conflicts based on an application of the relevant humanitarian law (see Appendix) and a careful review of the facts. The categories include: international armed conflicts, civil wars, and wars of national liberation in the exercise of the right to self-determination. When there is meaningful participation of [a] third party [ies] in a civil war or war of national liberation we so indicate.

In international armed conflicts, military action is taking place between two separate states, even if there has been no formal declaration of war. All treaty-based and customary humanitarian law of international armed conflict applies to these wars.

In civil wars, there is armed conflict taking place between government armed forces and the armed forces of opposition group(s) under responsible command and in control of sufficient territory to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. This description represents the customary international law test for civil war and is found, inter alia, in Article 1 of Protocol Additional II of the Geneva Conventions. The authors look especially at whether opposition groups have formed themselves into armies with training, materiel (including uniforms or some distinguishing insignia or attire), responsible command; at whether operations are primarily legitimate military operations as opposed to armed attacks on non-military targets or persons; and at whether the groups are sufficiently organized militarily to carry out Geneva Convention obligations. (Note: For this report, when we identify a conflict as a civil war we do not distinguish between countries bound by Protocol Additional II and those that are bound only by customary humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949). Where civil wars do exist, all customary humanitarian law of civil war, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, where applicable, Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions apply.

A group qualifies as a party to a civil war and is accordingly obligated and protected by relevant humanitarian law even if the group or some of its members violate humanitarian law obligations. However, a group not meeting the civil war criteria are not entitled to humanitarian law protections. If such a group or any of its members engage in the use of armed or other force, these acts may be considered crimes rather than acts of war.

In wars of national liberation in the exercise of self-determination, a foreign or alien power or a racist regime occupies or controls a country or area whose people have the right to self-determination under international standards. According to Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, humanitarian law continues to be applicable as long as the foreign or alien power occupies the area even if actual armed combat is rare or limited, as is the case in Chinese-occupied Tibet.

SC = Security Council

GA = General Assembly

Rpt S-G = Report (or note) of the Secretary-General

ECOSOC = Economic and Social Council

Comm = Commission on Human Rights

UNHCHR = United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Res = Resolution

The situation in Acheh is a war of national liberation in exercise of the right to self-determination.

In 1873, the Netherlands issued a formal declaration of war and began an invasion of the Kingdom of Acheh in the north of the island of Sumatra. The Achehnese resisted the occupation, and in 1942 the Dutch finally abandoned their attempt. In 1949 the Round Table Conference Agreements provided for a transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands’ territory of the "Dutch East Indies" to a United States of Indonesia. The Kingdom of Acheh was included in the Agreements despite the fact that it had never been incorporated into the Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently, through armed aggression by the Javanese dominated Indonesian government, Acheh was forcibly annexed.

Since annexation, the Achehnese have consistently rebelled against their occupation. In 1976 the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, also known as Acheh Merdeka or "Free Acheh," was founded as an armed resistance group, and a re-declaration of independence was issued. It is headed by Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, sometimes referred to as Prince Hasan Mohamad Tiro. In the late 1970’s, mass arrests shut down Acheh Merdeka’s activities until 1989, when they renewed attacks on police and military installations. At that time the Indonesian security forces began a counter-insurgency campaign resulting in the death and disappearance of civilians. Mr. di Tiro has been in exile for many years.

Although civilian killings have been attributed to both sides, human rights workers accuse the government of committing the most serious Geneva Convention abuses. Houses of villagers suspected to support or aid the rebels have been burned to the ground and the occupants have been subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, disappearance and summary execution. Villagers have also been used in "sweeps" for rebels, where they are forced to walk ahead of the security forces, point out insurgents, and provide a buffer against possible attack. In 1991, hundreds of refugees fled to Malaysia.

Additional support for independence comes from discriminatory economic conditions. Workers are prevented from forming free trade unions, and and are forced to labour for foreign companies at below subsistence wages. Villages remain poor despite the fact that Acheh is rich in natural resources, providing 15 percent of Indonesia’s exports.

The European Parliament passed a resolution on the conflict in February 1996 with an appeal to member states to prohibit arms sales to Indonesia.

Indonesian president Soeharto resigned in May 1998 after mass protests against his government. After he stepped down, numerous reports surfaced of human rights violations (rapes, torture, disappearances and extra-judicial killings) in Acheh by the military dating back to the beginning of the decade. Local activists put the number of disappearances at nearly 40,000.

Seventeen Indonesian human rights organizations issued a statement in October of 1998 accusing Mobil Oil of committing human rights abuses by providing logistical support (including equipment used to dig mass graves) to the military carrying out massacres. Mobil denies the allegations, but former employees have reported hearing rumors of killings and disappearances near drilling sites for the past decade, and hundreds of bodies have been exhumed from numerous gravesites in the area. Mobil is also accused of being responsible for environmental devastation and forced relocation. There have been numerous gas explosions in the area over the past twenty years.

There was increasing conflict between the rebels and security forces in 1999 due to anger over the continuing impunity of human rights violators. Abdurraham Wahid was elected president in the October 1999 elections. On his visit to the region in January 2000, President Wahid acknowledged that members of the security forces had tortured and killed in the past. A trial of suspects in five cases of abuse documented by an independent commission of inquiry began in early 2000. The cases include the shooting of 39 protesters in North Acheh in May 1999, and a massacre of 60 people during the recital of the Koran in West Acheh in July 1999.

Demands for self rule have been growing. In November 1999, several hundred thousand people held a peaceful protest in the capital, Banda Acheh, to demand a referendum. Although President Wahid made a statement agreeing that Acheh should have a vote similar to the one held in East Timor, he retracted it and is now offering incentives for staying part of Indonesia, including greater autonomy and control over natural resources.

Fighting broke out in February shortly after President Wahid’s January visit to Acheh, resulting in a reported 345 casualties by May 12, 2000 at which point Zaini Abdulla, representing Hasan di Tiro of Acheh Merdeka, signed a cease-fire agreement with Indonesia in a secret location near Geneva, Switzerland. Just prior to the cease fire’s inception date of June 2, 2000, Acheh military commander Teuku Don Zulfari was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur, Malasia. However, the cease-fire, to last three months, entered into force as planned, and at time of writing (June 2000) was holding.

The war has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties; some sources indicate as many as 50,000 deaths and 100,000 were wounded in the ‘90s.

The Round Table Conference Agreements: 69 UNT.S. 3 (1950).

Sub-Comm Decision 1993/108.

Sub-Comm Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/L.25.

Sub-Comm Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.7.

Report of the Working Group on Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1998/43; E/CN.4/1999/62.

Report of Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1999/63 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.2.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women:

Radhika Coomaraswamy: E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3.

The situation in Afghanistan is a civil war with international aspects in Tajikistan.

In 1992, groups of Afghan mujahideen—Islamic resistance fighters who fought from 1979-1989 to end military action by the USSR and to overthrow the Soviet installed government—began fighting each other for control of the country. As many as nine different groups were at one time fighting each other with aid from regional powers, including Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and with financial assistance from the United States. Over one million people died during the ten-year occupation.

In early 1995, a new faction of Islamic students called the Taliban joined the fighting and within six months controlled about 40% of the country. In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, ending President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s four-year rule. The Taliban imposed their version of strict Islamic law in areas under their control, requiring men to grow beards and women to veil, and prohibiting women from working outside the home and girls from attending school. By August 1998, the Taliban held about 90% of the country, but Rabbani’s government continued to be the recognized government at the UN. The northern provinces were held by the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition comprised of the ousted government and minority groups including Shiites and ethnic Uzbeks. After fighting near the town of Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997, more than 2000 Taliban prisoners of war were massacred by soldiers of the Alliance who were reputedly under the command of Abdul Malik Pahlawan.

Iran and Afghanistan began a series of military provocations in Summer 1998 after the Taliban reportedly killed eight Iranian diplomats and a reporter during an August 1998 sweep through Mazar-i-Sharif and other northern areas (see "Afghanistan/Iran" in the back). Over 2000 Afghani Hazaras—Shiite Muslims who have resisted rule by the Sunni Taliban—were murdered, and hundreds of Hazara girls and women were raped. In January 1998, more than 200 Afghan women refugees protested against both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance’s treatment of women and demanded that women receive the right to education.

Also in August 1998, the United States carried out a missle attack on training camps run by Saudi Osama bin Laden as part of its response to bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Taliban retaliated by killing an Italian aid worker in Kabul. As a result, the UN withdrew all its foreign workers in Afghanistan in October 1998.

In 1998, Russia began providing heavy weapons and training to the Northern Alliance, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, formerly supported by the US CIA. Up to 100,000 Pakistanis are suspected of having trained and fought in Afghanistan between 1994 and 1999. Thousands of Pakistanis, including youths from Islamic schools, were seen fighting with the Taliban during the 1999 offensive against Mazar-i-Sharif. The UEA and Saudi Arabia recognize the Taliban government and allegedly provide financial support.

In addition to bin Laden, the Taliban is reportedly harboring those responsible for an two assassination attempts on former Pakistani PM Sharif in early 1999, and Tahir Yuldashev, who is accused of being behind the assassination attempt on Uzbek President Karimov in February 1999. Bin Laden is reportedly training militants from Uzbekistan (see "Uzbekistan" in the back), Tajikistan (see "Tajikistan"), and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uighurs from China (see "China" in the back).

The UN returned in March 1999, sponsoring a power-sharing agreement, but fighting has continued in the northeast.

In October 1999, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden. The sanctions include the freezing of foreign assets and prohibition on receiving flights by the national airline Ariana. Although the sanctions do not include humanitarian flights, they are expected to exacerbate an already dire situation since a majority of Afghanis lack the basic necessities, and starvation and disease are rampant. The UN and the ICRC have estimated that more than two thirds of Kabul’s residents rely on humanitarian aid for their subsistence needs.

In November 1999, the Taliban agreed to allow the World Food Programme to set up a humanitarian relief corridor into the opposition-held Panjir Valley. Around 60,000 refugees in the area have been facing severe food shortages due to poor shelter, severe cold, and shortages of medicine. The road into the valley is regularly mined by both sides.

Close to three million Afghani refugees are living in camps outside of the country (including over 1.2 million in Pakistan), and two million are displaced. Rural areas are laced with an estimated 10 million land mines. In January 1999, UNICEF reported 9 of 10 girls and 2 of 3 boys are not in school, and that 257 of every 1000 children die before the age of 5. Hospitals have run out of supplies.

SC Res 1267 (10/15/99).

SC Res 1214 (12/8/98). SC Res 1193 (8/28/98).

SC Res 1138 (11/21/97). SC Res 1128 (9/12/97).

SC Res 1113 (6/12/97). SC Res 1099 (3/14/97).

SC Res 1076 (10/22/96). SC Res 1030 (1996).

SC Res 647 (1/11/90).

GA Res 54/189 (12/17/99).

GA Res 54/185 (12/17/99). GA Res 53/165 (12/9/98).

GA Res 52/211 (12/19/97). GA Res 52/145 (12/12/97).

GA Res 51/108 (12/12/96). GA Res 50/189 (12/22/95).

GA Res 50/88 (12/19/95). GA Res 49/207 (12/23/94).

GA Res 49/140 (12/20/94). GA Res 48/208 (12/21/93).

GA Res 48/152 (12/20/93). GA Res 47/141 (12/18/92).

GA Res 47/119 (12/18/92). GA Res 46/136 (12/17/91).

GA Res 46/23 (12/5/91). GA Res 45/174 (12/18/90).

GA Res 45/12 (11/7/90).

Comm Res 2000/18. Comm Res 1999/9.

Comm Res 1998/70. Comm Res 1997/65.

Comm Res 1996/75. Comm Res 1995/74.

Comm Res 1994/84. Comm Res 1993/66.

Comm Res 1992/68. Comm Res 1992/5.

Comm Res 1991/78. Comm Res 1991/4.

Comm Res 1990/5. Comm Res 1989/23.

Sub-Comm Res 1998/17. Sub-Comm Res 1999/14.

Rpt S-G (S/2000/205).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/13). Rpt S-G (S/1999/994).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/698). Rpt S-G (S/1999/362).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/913). Rpt S-G (S/1998/532).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/222). Rpt S-G (S/1997/894).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/719). Rpt S-G (S/1997/482).

Rpt S-G (S/1995/105). Rpt S-G (S/1994/1363).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/716). Rpt S-G (S/26743).

Rpt S-G (A/47/705-S/24831). Rpt S-G (A/46/577-S/23146 & Corr.1).

Rpt S-G (A/46/606). Rpt S-G (S/20911).

Reports of the Special Rapporteurs:

Felix Ermacora: E/CN.4/1990/25; E/CN.4/1991/31; E/CN.4/1992/33; E/CN.4/1993/42; E/CN.4/1994/53; E/CN.4/1995/64.

Choong-Hyun Paik: E/CN.4/1996/64; E/CN.4/1997/59; E/CN.4/1998/71.

Kamal Hossain: E/CN.4/1999/40; E/CN.4/2000/33.

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1990/13; E/CN.4/1991/20; E/CN.4/1992/18; E/CN.4/1993/25; E/CN.4/1994/26; E/CN.4/1995/36; E/CN.4/1996/38; E/CN.4/1997/34; E/CN.4/1998/43; E/CN.4/1999/62.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

S. Amos Wako: E/CN.4/1991/36.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel Rodley: E/CN/4/1998/38 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1999/61; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Report on Internally Displaced:

Francis M. Deng: E/CN.4/1995/50.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Angelo Vidal d’Almeida Ribeiro: E/CN.4/1995/91.

Abdelfattah Amor: E/CN.4/1997/91; E/CN.4/2000/65.

Report of Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women:

Radhika Coomaraswamy: E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.4.

The situation in Angola is a civil war with a recent peace agreement and renewed fighting.

Since winning its independence from Portugal, there have been 25 years of civil war between rebel fighters (Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces—Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The war was particularly brutal with widespread violations of humanitarian law by UNITA, including the killing of ICRC staff person Marc Blaser. Numerous "cease-fires" were in effect at one time or another, but it was not until the UN-sponsored elections of September 1992 that the rebel UNITA group participated in the electoral processes in Angola. However, after losing the vote, Savimbi resumed full-scale war with unprecedented violence. After rejecting the election results, UNITA was able to gain control of part of the country, but government advances uprooted the rebels and, in November 1994, the Lusaka Accord was signed.

A multiparty government was formed in early 1997 that included some UNITA members in the National Assembly, but Savimbi refused to participate. In October 1997, because of the continued failure to abide by the Lusaka Accord the UN Security Council imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions on UNITA, including freezing overseas assets and prohibiting travel.

Fighting resumed in March 1998 despite an agreement reached on January 9, 1998 for resolution of the remaining issues under the Lusaka Accord. Savimbi refused to move to the capital and join the government. UNITA forces quickly retook more than 300 areas previously returned to the government, but by the end of 1999, the government, with the support of Namibian government forces, had overrun UNITA’s former headquarters.

On December 23, 1998 and January 2, 1999, UNITA allegedly shot down two planes charted by the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) carrying a total of 23 persons. In January 2000, the UN Security Council viewed videotape evidence provided by former senior UNITA leaders proving that Savimbi personally ordered both the attacks and, in an attempt to disrupt the UN investigation of the incident, the burial of the planes’ fuselages. The UN withdrew its 1000 peacekeepers in November 1998; in October 1999 the Security Council voted to establish an office in the country to include 30 civilians (UNOA).

The war has resulted in the deaths of over one million people, with tens of thousands permanently disabled. According to UNICEF, more than 75,000 are amputees due to land mines. There are presently so many ceramic land mines (estimates as high as 20 million) that it would take years to clear them. There were 10,000 deaths from military activities and nearly 75,000 from starvation in 1999. At least 1.5 million were displaced as of January 2000 due to the war.

UNITA troops have also been fighting with rebel groups against the government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (see "Democratic Republic of Congo").

The Angolan government (MPLA) has been accused of detaining and murdering journalists and opposition politicians, and of committing atrocities during fighting along the Namibian border.

Canada’s Ambassador to the UN, Robert Fowler, headed a panel that reported to the Security Council in Spring 2000 on the failure of certain countries to observe the UN’s embargo on UNITA’s diamond marketing, believed to net UNITA $150 million.year. (See Press release, SC/6825 of March 15, 2000).

MONUA (7/97-3/99); UNAVEM (1/89-6/91); UNAVEM II (6/91-2/95); UNAVEM III (2/95- 6/97).

UNOA (10/99 to present).

SC Res 1295 (4/18/2000).

SC Res 1294 (4/13/2000). SC Res 1268 (10/15/99).

SC Res 1237 (5/7/99). SC Res 1229 (2/26/99).

SC Res 1221 (1/15/99). SC Res 1219 (12/31/98).

SC Res 1213 (12/3/98). SC Res 1202 (10/15/98).

SC Res 1195 (9/15/98). SC Res 1190 (8/13/98).

SC Res 1180 (6/29/98). SC Res 1176 (6/24/98).

SC Res 1173 (6/12/98). SC Res 1164 (4/29/98).

SC Res 1157 (3/20/98). SC Res 1149 (1/27/98).

SC Res 1135 (10/29/97). SC Res 1130 (9/29/97).

SC Res 1127 (8/28/97). SC Res 1118 (6/30/97).

SC Res 1106 (4/16/97). SC Res 1102 (3/31/97).

SC Res 1098 (2/27/97). SC Res 1087 (12/11/96).

SC Res 1075 (10/11/96). SC Res 1064 (7/11/96).

SC Res 1055 (5/8/96). SC Res 1045 (2/8/96).

SC Res 1008 (8/7/95). SC Res 976 (2/8/95).

SC Res 966 (12/8/94). SC Res 952 (10/27/94).

SC Res 945 (9/29/94). SC Res 932 (6/30/94).

SC Res 922 (5/31/94). SC Res 903 (3/16/94).

SC Res 890 (12/15/93). SC Res 864 (9/15/93).

SC Res 851 (7/15/93). SC Res 834 (6/1/93).

SC Res 823 (4/30/93). SC Res 811 (3/12/93).

SC Res 804 (1/29/93). SC Res 793 (11/30/92).

SC Res 785 (10/30/92). SC Res 747 (3/24/91).

SC Res 696 (5/20/91). SC Res 626 (12/20/88).

GA Res 54/17 (10/29/99). GA Res 48/202 (12/21/93).

GA Res 48/173 (2/22/93). GA Res 47/164 (12/18/92).

Comm Res 1994/88. Comm Res 1993/9.

Rpt S-G (S/2000/23).

Rpt S-G (S/2000/304). Rpt S-G (S/1999/202).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/49). Rpt S-G (S/1998/1110).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/931). Rpt S-G (S/1998/838).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/723). Rpt S-G (S/1998/524).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/333). Rpt S-G (S/1998/236).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/17). Rpt S-G (S/1997/807).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/741). Rpt S-G (S/1997/640).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/438 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/1997/304).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/248). Rpt S-G (S/1997/239).

Rpt S-G (S/1995/842). 1st Prog Rpt S-G (S/1995/177).

Rpt S-G (S/1995/97 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/1994/1376).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/1197). Rpt S-G (S/1994/1069).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/865). Rpt S-G (S/1994/740 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/611). Rpt S-G (S/1994/374).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/282 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/1994/100).

Rpt S-G (S/26872). Further Rpt S-G (S/26644 & Add.1)

Further Rpt S-G (S/26434). Further Rpt S-G (S/26060).

Further Rpt S-G (S/25840). Rpt S-G (S/24996).

Rpt S-G (S/24858). Rpt S-G (S/24556).

Rpt S-G (S/24145).

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel S. Rodley: E/CN.4/1994/31; E/CN.4/1995/34; E/CN.4/1999/61; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

S. Amos Wako: E/CN.4/1990/22.

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1993/46; E/CN.4/1995/61; E/CN.4/1996/4;

E/CN.4/1997/60 & Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries:

Enrique Bernales Ballesteros: E/CN.4/1991/14; E/CN.4/1992/12; E/CN.4/1993/18; E/CN.4/1994/23; E/CN.4/1995/29; E/CN.4/1997/24.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression:

Abid Hussain: E/CN.4/2000/63.

The situation in Bougainville is a war of national liberation in exercise of the right to self-determination with a cease fire and peace talks.

For eleven years, a war for self-rule has been fought on this Papua New Guinea-controlled island. After Papua New Guinea obtained independence from Australia in 1975, a secessionist threat by Bougainville was mollified by granting the island self-government. Fighting began in 1988 when land owners were denied billions of dollars in compensation for environmental damage caused by an Australian-owned copper mine. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) declared the island’s independence in 1990 and maintained complete control until 1992.

Since the beginning of the conflict, Papua New Guinea has suspended constitutional, judicial and other human rights protections. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) were said to be especially brutal, blockading needed food and medical supplies from civilians and forcibly removing 20,000 to 40,000 villagers to "care centers" and then burning their villages. There are also allegations that the BRA has carried out extrajudicial killings of suspected spies.

In early March 1997, Sir Julius Chan, then Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, made an aborted attempt to hire South African mercenaries to fight the BRA. His actions lead to widespread protests and precipitated his immediate downfall.

A truce was signed in October 1997 whereby the parties promised to protect human rights, promote peace and reconciliation, and end restrictions on freedom of movement. A team of 250 unarmed troops and civilians from neighboring countries arrived in December 1997, charged with observing and reporting on the truce. In January 1998, the Lincoln Accord, signed by all parties, made the truce permanent and led to a permanent cease-fire as of April 30, 1998. The Lincoln Accord also provides for elections and independence talks. On January 1, 1999, the former transition government was suspended and the Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) was established. All parties to the conflict participated in the adoption of its constitution. In November 1999, the PNG Supreme Court found that the establishment of the BRG was illegal and ordered the restoration of the provincial government, setting back the peace process. Francis Ona, the leader of the BRA, stopped participating in the disarmament process and threatened to resume fighting. Rebel leaders continue to demand a referendum on independence.

Previously secret Australian Government documents, released for the first time on January 1, 2000, reveal that even before construction of the Panguna copper mine, the Australian Government was aware of the intense landowner opposition to the project and had considered the possibility of using military force to complete it.

An estimated 10,000 people have been killed since 1989, and at least 40% of the population has been displaced.

ECOSOC Dec. 1994/267.

Comm Res 1995/65. Comm Res 1994/81.

Comm Res 1993/76. Comm Dec 1993/111.

Sub-Comm Res 1994/21. Sub-Comm Res 1992/19.

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/58). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1995/60 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1994/58).

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

P. Kooijmans: E/CN.4/1991/17.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

S. Amos Wako: E/CN.4/1991/36.

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1994/7; E/CN.4/1996/4 & Add.2; E/CN.4/1997/60 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1998/68 & Add.1.

The situation in Burma involves two separate armed conflicts: a civil war and a war of national liberation in exercise of the right of self-determination.

The State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC), the new name for the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), is currently in power despite the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) overwhelming election win in May 1990. The winners were killed, imprisoned or forced into internal and international exile. Survivors, and other political opposition leaders, formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). The SPDC/SLORC army has been fighting a civil war against opposition forces under the united command of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) ever since. The DAB is composed of both members of the NCGUB and a number of armed forces of several of the ethnic nationalities.

Burma’s many ethnic nationalities, including the Karen, the Mon, the Kachin, the Shan, the Karenni, and the Rohingya, a Muslim group from the Arakan State, have suffered under long-standing oppression by the Burmese government. The Rohingya began fleeing in 1990 after they were attacked by SPDC/SLORC and driven off their traditional lands. The Karen and Mon have also been driven to refuge, both internally and over the border into Thailand.

In addition to this civil war, the other war within Burma is the war of national liberation in exercise of the right of self-determination between the SPDC/SLORC army and the military forces of the Karenni State. The SLORC war against the Karenni forces is considered separately because the Karenni State is not part of the DAB. The Karenni State has historically maintained itself independent of Burma and has consistently invoked the right to self-determination. According to the Karenni, the SPDC/SLORC regime seeks to deprive the Karenni of their sovereignty—a right granted to them in the Burmese Constitution of 1947. The state, which comprises approximately 4,800 square miles along the Thai border, has formed a government with a legislature of district representatives, military forces, and a diplomatic corp.

The SPDC/SLORC regime has been one of the worst violators of human rights. In addition to lack of political freedom, the people of Burma suffer summary executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and denial of respect for freedom of the press, religion, association and assembly. Economic, social and cultural rights are also severely violated, including by the ecological plundering of Burma. The SLORC forces have also been gruesome in the wars, enslaving civilians as porters for their army, torturing and killing captured combatants, and carrying out military operations against civilians and communities.

In 1994/95 there was relocation and forced labor in the Arakan State. SLORC had been seizing one Mon per household (an estimated 150,000 people in 1995) and using them as slave laborers on the Ye-Tavoy railway, related to the signed one billion-dollar gas pipeline contract with UNOCAL and Total. The army has continued to relocate inhabitants and destroy villages along the pipeline route through Mon and Karen land. The Karen lost their headquarters at Mannerplaw in mid-January 1995. In February 1997, the SLORC forces began another series of attacks against the Karen people and the Karen National Union forces near the Thai border. The KNU abandoned their Teakaplaw headquarters, burning it in retreat. About 90,000 Karen civilians managed to flee into Thailand but another group was trapped in Burma. There were some allegations that Thai officials forced Karen refugees back across the border. The SLORC army of 100,000 troops clearly outnumber the Karen’s 2500 defenders. In early March 1997, Burmese troops crossed into Thailand to raid a refugee camp, but they were repelled by Thai soldiers.

On January 1, 1996, after the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) renounced a March 1995 cease-fire agreement, their base at Doi Thi Sak was attacked by SLORC. SLORC attacked again in June 1996, sending 2000 troops into areas designated as Karenni under the agreement. It has been reported that large numbers of Karenni villagers who were forcibly relocated to camps by the government in early 1996 continue in serious condition from illnesses related to overcrowding and lack of medical attention. Skirmishes continued into 1997 between Karenni and SLORC troops. The Karenni troops captured SLORC military materiel such as G3 ammunition magazines and other munitions. Even more Karenni and Shan people were forcibly relocated to central Shan state in early Summer 1997 as part of the SLORC regime’s "Four Cuts Operation" strategy to keep villages from assisting the Karenni and Shan resistance armies. By August 1997, 160 villages had been destroyed and the people forced out.

Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD opposition, was released in July 1995 after six years of house arrest, but her movements remain strictly monitored and she has been prevented from meeting with supporters in the provinces and with the foreign press. Twenty-nine NLD members of parliament elected in 1990 remain in prison, and seven party members were sentenced in December 1997 to six years or more for "disturbing the public law and order." Hundreds of NLD members have been arrested and harassed because of their party affiliation. In November 1997, 14 ministers of the 20-member SLORC cabinet were removed from office, and the SLORC government reconstituted itself as the State Peace and Development Committee. The top leaders of SLORC remain in power.

The international community has provided legitimacy for SPDC/SLORC’s retention of power by allowing SPDC/SLORC to be seated as the government at the UN (now as Myanmar) and through "official" visits and negotiations. Western countries have cut economic and political ties somewhat but Asian countries have continued trade relations. Myanmar was accepted as a member of ASEAN in 1998. SPDC/SLORC has received over 1 billion dollars worth of arms from China over the past few years and is believed in return to be providing port and basing facilities on the coast of Arakan, the location of civilian expulsions. In May 1997, the United States banned American companies from investing in Burma.

In September 1998, the NLD convened the "Committee Representing the People’s Parliament" an organization set up to represent and make decisions on behalf of NLD members elected to Parliament in 1990. Subsequently, Suu Kyi gave a radio address asking for international recognition of the Committee. There is no current Parliament sitting because the SPDC/SLORC has been drawing up a new constitution. In October 1998, 700 NLG members were detained in government guest houses until they willing to accept SPDC’s legitimacy.

In January 1999, it was reported the five battalions of Burmese infantry financed by UNOCAL and Total have been sent to the pipeline area to suppress the Shan and Karen. UNOCAL and Total deny this. The Karen have been accused of trying to sabotage the pipeline. Both the Karen National Union (KNU) and SPDC troops are now using landmines and SPDC is accused of destroying rice crops to cause starvation of the Karen. The Karenni Progressive Party and Shan State aligned with a reputed combined force of 6,000, and the combined forces carried out sporadic military against SPDC throughout 1999.

Members of a splinter group of the KNU called "God’s Army," controlled by twelve-year-old twin boys, and a rebel student group called the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors (VBSW), seized a hundred hostages in a Thai hospital in January, 2000. All ten rebels were killed after an assault by Thai commandos. It is feared that the Thai government will take a hard-line position toward the KNU due to the attack. The Karen rely on the existence of a porous border for supply routes and protection from attacks by the Burmese security forces. The new leader of the KNU has said that the KNU will participate in peace talks if there is an official cease-fire.

In October 1999, the VBSW seized 38 hostages in the Burmese embassy in Bangkok. In that incident, the students were able to exchange their hostages for transportation to the border while maintaining the support of the Thai Government, who angered the SPDC by referring to the VBSW as "freedom fighters." The twins leading the "God’s Army" left the group in Spring 2000.

While accusing the government of ethnic cleansing, the leader of the Shan State Army (South) announced in January 2000 that the group is going to give up its military struggle and instead pursue political negotiations. Yawd Serk, the head military commander, said that the decision was due to the fact that his people are tired of living in fear of rape, torture, and hunger. He said that tens of thousands of his people had died in battle in the last few years. More than 300,000 people in the Shan State have been forcibly relocated from their villages by the government since 1996.

Over 100,000 persons from the ethnic nationalities are in refugee camps along the Thai border and accusations continue that Thai officials periodically drive them back over the border. The European Union continues to provide aid to refugees.

GA Res 54/186 (12/17/99).

GA Res 53/162 (12/9/98). GA Res 52/137 (12/12/97).

GA Res 51/117 (12/12/96) GA Res 50/194 (12/22/95).

GA Res 49/197 (12/23/94). GA Res 48/150 (12/20/93).

GA Res 47/144 (12/18/92). GA Res 46/132 (12/17/91).

Comm Res 2000/23. Comm Res 1999/17.

Comm Res 1998/63. Comm Res 1997/64.

Comm Res 1996/80. Comm Res 1995/72.

Comm Res 1994/85. Comm Res 1993/73.

Comm Res 1992/58.

Sub-Comm Res 1993/19.

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/2000/29). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1999/29).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1995/150). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/AC.45/1994/4).

Reports of the Special Rapporteur:

Reports of the Working Group on Disappearances:

Reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Report on Internally Displaced:

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression:

Report of Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women:

The situation in Burundi is a civil war.

The two peoples of Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi and the Hutu, lived in relative harmony until around a hundred years ago. Under colonization rule by Germany (until 1897 the area was called German East Africa) and then by Belgium, the Tutsi minority was given privileges and education that the Hutu did not receive. In 1962, Rwanda and Burundi became separate, independent countries.

Unlike neighboring Rwanda, in Burundi the Tutsi minority kept power after the Belgians were forced to leave. They suppressed bloody Hutu uprisings in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. After attacks on Tutsis in 1972, the Tutsi government issued a paper on "the need to achieve parity through elimination of the Hutu surplus," and then massacred 300,000 people. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu and the first democratically elected president, was murdered by the Tutsi-dominated army in 1993. Subsequent fighting resulted in more than 150,000 dead. His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira died with the president of Rwanda when their plane was shot down. A subsequent peace pact that divided power between a Hutu president and a Tutsi prime minister ended when the Hutu president Sylvestre Ntibantuganya was removed from power by the military in July 1996, and Pierre Buyoya seized the presidency, which he still holds. The most recent violence began with the arrival of refugees responsible for the Rwandan massacre (see "Rwanda").

The current fighting began in 1996 between the Hutu rebels (The National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD)) and the Tutsi-dominated army. Tens of thousands of civilians fled to refugee camps in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In October 1996, the then-rebel force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo dispersed the camps on the Burundi /Rwanda borders where Hutu rebels from both countries had been based. Over a hundred thousand civilian Hutu refugees who had fled attacks by Burundi’s army were also forced back over the border. There were numerous reports of disappearances of returning refugees and confirmed accounts of refugee massacres in Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some of the refugees fled to Tanzania where there were already over a hundred thousand people from conflicts throughout the region.

The fighting continued throughout 1997 and 1998. 1998 began with an attack near Bujumbura’s airport killing as many as 300, for which both the CNDD and the government denied responsibility. The attack left as many as 15,000 newly homeless, joining the tens of thousands of people already displaced. The CNDD has accused the army of killing almost 40,000 civilians since its 1996 coup, while the Burundian officials accuse the rebels of massacres On January 28, 1998, Colonel Firmin Sinzoyiheba, Burundian Minister of Defense, was killed in a helicopter crash.

The regional sanctions imposed by six African countries after the 1996 coup were suspended on January 23, 1999. In spite of the sanctions, weaponry continued to reach both government and CNDD forces. The sanctions dramatically affected the Burundian civilian population, and more than a year after the lifting of the sanctions malnutrition is still widespread, and health and healthcare have deteriorated to a level of deepest concern. Shortages of seed and fertilizer place future harvests at great risk. By December 1997 the UN Rapporteur had urged a halt to the sanctions.

There are now at least three different groups fighting in Burundi, with the main groups being the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) and its military wing the National Liberation Forces (NLF); the Front for National Liberation (Frolina); and the CNDD and its military wing the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). There are reports that these groups use bases inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reliable information supports accusations of mass killings of unarmed civilians by all parties. The Burundian Army is said to target Hutu civilians in reprisal for opposition armed attacks. The Army has also been accused of rape, torture and killing detainees. Opposition groups have also been accused of attacking refugees.

About 600,000 people (one-tenth of the population) are internally displaced, and there has been considerable forced relocation of Hutu civilians into widely condemned "regroupment" camps, blamed for many deaths and the destruction of houses and crops.

A cease-fire has been in effect since July, 1998, although there continues to be numerous clashes. In 1999, Nelsen Mandela agreed to mediate. Just prior to his first visit to the country on April 28, 2000, there was renewed fighting near Bujumbura as well as other locations in spite of a call for cease fire. Mr. Mandela seeks to achieve an agreement with the Burundi armed forces on power-sharing. After Mr. Mandela’s visit, there was an increase in the clashes, leading to thousands of additional displaced persons in the south. Mr. Mandela held a second round of separate talks in Johannesburg with the different factions, leading to promises for a draft proposal by the end of June, subsequently postponed to allow the two main rebel groups time to for further study. At the end of May, the fighting intensified near Bujumbura. On June 7, 2000 Mr. Mandela reached an agreement with President Buyoya on two key points: (1) army restructuring along ethnically-equal lines; and (2) the closure of the Hutu "regroupment" camps by July 31. There is a planned "all party" session in July 2000 in Arusha, Tanzania.

Over 200,000 people have been killed in this war since Ndadaye’s assassination in 1993.

SC Res 1286 (1/19/2000).

SC Res 1080 (11/15/96). SC Res 1078 (11/9/96).

SC Res 1072 (8/30/96). SC Res 1049 (3/5/96).

SC Res 1040 (1/29/96). SC Res 1012 (8/28/95).

GA Res 50/159 (12/22/95).

GA Res 49/7 (10/25/94). GA Res 48/17 (1993).

Comm Res 2000/20.

Comm Res 1999/10. Comm Res 1998/82.

Comm Res 1997/77. Comm Res 1996/1.

Comm Res 1995/90. Comm Res 1994/86.

Sub-Comm Res 1996/4. Sub-Comm Res 1996/3.

Sub-Comm Res 1995/11. Sub-Comm Res 1994/17.

Rpt S-G (S/1997/547). 2nd Rpt S-G (S/1995/65).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1995/66). Rpt S-G (S/1994/1152).

Report of the Security Council Mission: S/1994/1039; S/1995/164.

Notes by the Secretariat:

E/CN.4/1999/43; E/CN.4/2000/34.

Report of the Special Rapporteur:

Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1994/26; E/CN.4/1995/36; E/CN.4/1996/38; E/CN.4/1997/34;

E/CN.4/1998/43; E/CN.4/1999/62; E/CN.4/2000/64.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1995/61; E/CN.4/1996/4 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1997/60 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1998/68 & Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add. 1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Report on Internally Displaced:

Francis M. Deng: E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.2 & Corr.1; E/CN.4/1997/43.

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict:

Olara Otunnu: E/CN.4/2000/71.

The situation in Chechnya is a civil war. The history of Chechnya may support a claim of self-determination.

Although the czars began a three-hundred year attempt to subjugate the Northern Caucasus in 1560, by 1585 Chechnya and other areas of the Caucasus had been conquered by the Ottoman Empire and represented its northern reach into what has become modern Russia. Under Ottoman rule, the Chechens adopted Islam. Russia continued its attempt to capture the area and finally forced the retreat of the Ottomans by 1785. After winning the Caucasian war (1817-1864), the Russians deported hundreds of thousands of Chechens. In 1877, 1920, 1929, 1940 and 1943 the Chechens made unsuccessful attempts to rebel against the czars and then the USSR. While most of the Chechen males were fighting against Hitler in the winter of 1943-44, Stalin ordered Chechnya obliterated. Villages were burned, 500,000 people were deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia, and their land was given to non-Chechens. In 1957, the Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland.

Dzhokhar Dudayev seized power in Chechnya in August 1991. After a popular vote elected him president that November, Dudayev declared independence from the Soviet Union, a month before its collapse. In August 1994, the Russian government began military action to stop Chechnya’s seceding, with aerial bombing and attacks on the capital of Grozny in December 1994 and February 1995. Subsequently, the rebel Chechen government moved to the hills and Chechnya was put under an armed Russian occupation.

Six workers from the International Committee of the Red Cross were murdered in their sleep, allegedly by Chechen rebels, in December 1996, the worst premeditated attack in the history of the organization.

The Russian army fully withdrew on January 5, 1997, following an August 1996 agreement granting the republic autonomy and establishing it as a free economic zone, with its final political status to be resolved before December 31, 2000. Russia and Chechnya (represented by Boris Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, respectively) signed a peace agreement on May 12, 1997, in which Russia pledged never to use force or threaten the use of force in relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Chechnya. Even so, skirmishes were reported along the Russia/Chechnya border in 1997. On July 8, 1997, nine Russian policemen were killed when a truck carrying 15 border guards was blown up in neighbouring Dagestan.. Chechen presidential elections on January 27, 1998 were won by Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen military chief of staff in charge of the war effort. President Maskhadov appointed Shamil Baseyev prime minister and asked him to form a new government. Baseyev is wanted for arrest in Moscow for his command of a hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk in 1995 that led to the death of 100 people.

An estimated 100,000 people were killed in that phase of the war. Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Jews, Armenians and other minority groups have been expelled or have voluntarily fled (see "Georgia").

In 1998, there was increasing lawlessness in the Republic, including banditry, smuggling, and kidnappings. Foreigners, aid workers, and journalists have been especially targeted, causing most to leave the Republic. On October 3, 1998, a New Zealander and 3 British were abducted. Their beheaded remains were found on December 8 after a failed rescue attempt. On December 12, 1998, Vincent Cochetel, head of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ mission in North Ossetia was freed in Chechnya by Russian Special Forces after 11 months in captivity. On July 23, 1998, there was an assassination attempt against President Maskhadov.

In August and September 1999, Baseyev twice lead a rebel force into neighboring Dagestan in an attempt join up with Bagaouddin, a local nationalist leader fighting Dagestani and Russian forces. In the process, they destroyed villages and created over 30,000 refugees. The Russian military pushed them back into Chechnya after severe fighting. Subsequently, there were several bombings of apartment buildings in Russia proper that killed around 300 people. Basayev is believed to be behind the attacks, but he has denied responsibility and there is no evidence that Chechens were involved. Since the bombings there has been an exponential increase in animosity toward all Chechens throughout Russia. In Moscow, there was a roundup of Caucasian people, and temporary camps were set up for people without proper identification.

The Russian military invaded the Republic in October, 1999. It has been accused of shelling numerous Chechen towns and villages and using fuel-air bombs, which kill indiscriminately over a wide area and are capable of killing people hiding in underground shelters. Atrocities by Russian troops were reported in the town of Alkhan-Yurt in December, including looting, burning of houses, and the massacre of 22 civilians who attempted to protect their property.

In early December 1999, Russia began to focus military action on Grozny but floundered. By mid-January 2000, Russia had renewed the assault on Grozny, and in early February, thousands of rebels fled Grozny to the mountains.

There are an estimated 250,000 refugees from the renewed fighting. There have been reports of Russian authorities forcing refugees back into Chechnya and denying refugees food rations to make them return to Russian-controlled areas of the Republic, and of bombardment of refugee columns by Russian forces. Some refugees entering Ingushetia have reportedly been sent to secret camps where they have been beaten.

On February 28, 2000, Alvaro Gil-Robles, Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe, showing clear shock at the degree of devastation of Grozny, called on the necessity to end the war and to aid the civilian population as soon as possible. There have been reports that Russia considers Grozny too ruined to be rebuilt, but Commissioner Gil-Robles insists that the reconstruction of Grozny is "very important. It is a symbol for the Chechen people."

While Russian troops have apparently defeated the "main bands," Russian authorities report that many small groups remain. There have been numerous small skirmishes. Attacks on Russian troops in Ingushetia have produced fears of a widening conflict and Russia now accuses both Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia of arming the Chechen groups. On May 31, 2000, Russian official Sergei Zverev and another high official were killed in Grozny. On June 8, 2000, the new Russian President Vladimir Putin announced "direct rule" for Chechnya, barely a week after a visit by American President Clinton, and on June 12, 2000, appointed Muslim cleric Akhmad Kadyrov as civilian leader of the Kremlin-controlled administration in Chechnya. On June 9, 2000, three Russian medical doctors were killed and a "suicide" bomber killed several soldiers in an attack on a Russian base. Sporadic gunfire continues almost on a daily basis. Meanwhile, Grozny remains in shambles. Casualty figures for this second stage are difficult to assess, but may exceed figures for the earlier stage of conflict.

Comm Res 2000/58.

Sub-Comm Statement 1995.

Sub-Comm Dec 1996/108.

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1997/10). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/13 & Add.1).

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1996/4; E/CN.4/1997/60 & Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add. 1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1999/62.

Report of the Working Group on Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1997/34.

Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1999/63.

Report of Representative of S-G on IDPs:

Francis Deng: E/CN.4/2000/83.

The situation in Colombia is a civil war between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército Popular (FARC-EP) and the Colombian Government. In addition to the FARC-EP/government civil war, there is a high degree of violent unrest from other groups which does not, in the authors’ opinion, meet the criteria for civil war regarding those participants.

There has been armed violence in Colombia’s countryside for over four decades. The current phase began in 1964, when the FARC-EP was formed, claiming to be a Marxist guerrilla organization with the stated goals of land and income redistribution in the favour of Colombia’s rural and urban poor. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was founded a few years later with similar goals; these two groups remain the principal armed groups in Colombia. In addition, there are the right-wing paramilitary organizations, principal among them the AUC, and a number of smaller leftist rebel forces, such as the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL). Over 40-50% of the country is involved, especially the most productive agricultural and resource-rich regions.

The FARC-EP claims 17,000 soldiers and several hundred thousand civilian activists, and has typically used a mix of both strikes against military targets and kidnapping, extortion, strikes against civilian targets, and strikes on the transportation, communication, and power infrastructures to pressure the Colombian Government. However, the FARC-EP have stepped up legitimate military engagements in recent years, and now appears to meet the minimum test for civil war. Factors in this assessment include: (1) their consolidation of control in the demilitarized zone in the south, (2) their sustained military offensive of July 1999, (3) proof of adequate conditions for the hundreds of POWs in FARC-EP control, and (4) the negotiations they have entered into with the Colombian Government.

The ELN is estimated to have 5000 "soldiers" who predominantly engage in hostage-taking and other acts that are illegal under humanitarian law. For this reason the authors have determined that the ELN does not qualify as a combatant force under humanitarian law.

There are an estimated 20,000 people in various right-wing paramilitary groups (5,000 alone in the AUC), primarily concentrated in Urabá. They have almost exclusively targeted civilians, regularly massacring scores of suspected sympathizers of the FARC-EP or ELN, and hence their non-qualification as combatants under humanitarian law. Their ties with the Colombian military are extensive and well-documented by national and international NGOs and by the Colombian government itself. According to the reports, army officers provide weapons and training, share intelligence, and conduct joint operations with paramilitary groups on a daily basis throughout the country and with total impunity. Mary Robinson, in her 1999 report before the Commission on Human Rights, stated that human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law had worsened in the past year, and that "She regrets the continued reliable evidence of the participation and  complicity of the security forces in the crimes committed by these illegal armed groups."

The FARC-EP, the ELN, and the paramilitary groups have all been implicated in the cultivation and trafficking of drugs, primarily cocaine and heroin; sources estimate that the paramilitaries receive up to 70% of their funding from the drug trade. The "war on drugs" has been the professed reason for heightened foreign involvement, primarily US, in Colombia’s domestic affairs and armed forces.

Human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law, where applicable, are rampant on all sides of the conflict. Although the accusations against the Colombian armed forces have decreased slightly in the past few years, the accusations against the paramilitaries have skyrocketed, as the military has utilized these groups more extensively. All sides have also been accused of using child soldiers in combat.

The Summer of 1999 saw an escalation in armed confrontations between the FARC-EP and government forces. On June 21-23, at least 39 government soldiers, 20 FARC-EP guerrillas, 4 paramilitary members, and 10 villagers died when a FARC-EP column entered the right-wing paramilitary stronghold of Nudo de Paramillo in the mountains of Cordoba province. On July 9-12, 1999, the FARC-EP, in unusual coordination with the ELN, attacked in 20 areas across the country, bombing banks, blowing up bridges, and attacking police and military installations. The government said that 287 rebels and at least 59 soldiers and police were killed. The FARC-EP appeared on their way to take Bogotá, when they were driven back by government forces, possibly thanks to US-supplied military intelligence. In early August, 1999, the FARC-EP carried out a three-day siege on a police station in Narino, NW of Bogotá.

A two-day FARC-EP offensive in November 1999 against 13 municipalities in west-central Colombia left more than 100 FARC-EP troops dead according to the Government, That offensive was followed by a week of heavy fighting in mid-December, during which 200 soldiers from the FARC-EP and the federal army were killed, including 45 marines killed when FARC-EP took over the Juradó Pacific naval base.

After a cease-fire declared by the FARC-EP from December 20 - January 10, 2000 ended, fighting resumed with the deaths of 24 in 3 towns near Ecuador, and of 45 FARC-EP soldiers near Bogotá. Peace talks resumed in January. Scores of FARC-EP, government soldiers, civilians, and paramilitary members were killed in skirmishes during February and March, including one incident in which 20 villagers were killed by right-wing paramilitaries in Ovejas.

The ELN had had its political status withdrawn by the Government after they hijacked a plane and took its passengers hostage in April 1999. The ELN responded by kidnapping over 100 civilians in a church mass in Cali on May 31, 1999, but talks began again in October, 1999, and their political status was restored in June, 2000. During 1999, the ELN bombed more than 200 pylons to protest the privatisation of electricity companies. The ELN launched 40 attacks across Colombia in first few days of April 2000, including the kidnapping of 23 motorists. At the end of the month, President Pastrana agreed to establish a demilitarised zone concentrated in the department of Bolívar in the north of Colombia for the ELN, as he had done for the FARC-EP in the south, in which to hold peace talks.

The FARC-EP in April announced that they would begin to kidnap millionaires who did not pay their war tax (Law 002), expropriate large land holdings in the area they control, and establish their own justice system in a bid for greater legitimacy. On April 29, they also established a political party, the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia, which would operate clandestinely for fear of attacks by right-wing paramilitaries. (Previous attempts to establish a political party in the 1980’s ended in the deaths of over 2000 of its members). The FARC-EP’s new initiatives, including a plan to increase their fighting force to 32,000 members, have been interpreted as an attempt to keep pace with the massive increase in military expenditures called for in the Government’s Plan Colombia. The 3-year Plan comprises a budget of $7.6 billion, $4.8 billion of which is slated for the military. Of that amount, $1.6 billion is requested from the US, $1.3 billion for military hardware. US congressional approval is expected in Summer, 2000. Although ostensibly "anti-drug," the equipment is destined for FARC-EP-controlled areas, a fact prompting US Senator Patrick J. Leahy to state, "What we are seeing is a dramatic ratcheting up of a counterinsurgency policy in the name of counterdrug policy." Europe is also to provide $1.25 billion.

Talks between the FARC-EP and the Government were hopeful after a joint 2-week trip through Europe in February 2000 by representatives of FARC-EP and the government, but were temporarily derailed in May when officials blamed the FARC-EP for the May 15 "necklace bomb" that killed two in the municipality of Chiquinquirá, department of Boyacá. The government withdrew their accusations, and talks on drug trafficking are scheduled to resume in the town of Los Pozos, 700 miles south of Bogotá, at the end of June and on a potential cease-fire on 3 July. Despite the peace talks, the fighting has continued in May, 2000 with 30 dead in combat between the FARC-EP and paramilitaries in the municipality of Paz de Ariporo in the department of Casanare, and the deaths of 15 FARC-EP in Urabá. The FARC-EP has been accused lately of stepping up attacks that threaten civilians, especially through the use of non-conventional weapons such as gas-cylinder bombs. At this time, FARC-EP holds an estimated 500-600 Colombian security force personnel as POW’s, and provided evidence in January 2000 as to their good treatment.

The violence has claimed over 35,000 lives in the last 10 years, and it is estimated that 3000 more people are being killed every year; the right-wing paramilitary organizations by themselves account for 1,000 civilian deaths in 125 massacres in 1999. Up to 1.5 million have been displaced, with 150,000 new IDCs every year, and over 800,000 Colombians have emigrated during the last four years alone. Colombia has the highest rate of kidnapping in the world, with 2945 people kidnapped in 1999.

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1997/50). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/29).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/31/Add.1). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/57).

Rpt UNHCHR:

E/CN.4/1997/11; E/CN.4/1998/16; E/CN.4/1999/8; E/CN.4/2000/11.

Report of the UNHCHR on Human Rights and Mass Exoduses:

E/CN.4/1997/42.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel S. Rodley: E/CN.4/1996/35 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1998/38 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1999/61;E/CN.4/2000/9 & Add.1.

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1998/43; E/CN.4/1999/62; E/CN.4/2000/64.

Decisions and opinions of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1996/40/Add.1; E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.1.

Reports by Representative of S-G on Internally Displaced Persons:

Francis Deng: E/CN.4/1999/79; E/CN.4/2000/83 & Add.1.

Note by Secretariat on Violations of Rights of Human Rights Defenders:

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/4.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers:

Param Cumaraswamy: E/CN.4/1996/37; E/CN.4/1998/39 & Add.2; E/CN.4/2000/61.

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict:

Olara Otunnu: E/CN.4/2000/71.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance:

Maurice Glèlè-Ahanhanzo: E/CN.4/1997/71/Add.1.

Commission Chairperson’s Statement:

OHCHR/STM/98/2; OHCHR/STM/99/3; OHCHR/STM/00/22.

The situation in Comoros (the Comoran Federation) is a civil war, with fighting between rival separatist groups.

In 1974, the four Comoran Islands were given the choice of independence or remaining under French administration. Grande Comore, Anjouan and Moheli chose independence, and formed the Comoran Islamic Federation. Mayotte voted by referendum to remain under French rule.

The Federation has had 18 coup attempts in 22 years, and its inhabitants have a significantly lower per capita income than those of Mayotte, who receive subsidized benefits from France.

In March 1997, the islands of Anjouan and Moheli declared their secession from the Federation and their desire to return to French rule, claiming that the federal government on Grande Comore did not support their development and gave Grande Comore residents better jobs. When France disavowed any intent to reclaim the islands, Moheli gave up its secession claim. Fighting began between rival militias on Anjouan. Anjouan’s self-proclaimed president Foundi Abdulla Ibrahim decided to renegotiate the island’s relationship with the Federation. Anjouan Prime Minister Abdou Mohammed Mindhi and the former prime minister Chamasse Said Omar decided to declare independence.

In September 1998, 300 troops from the Federation sought to retake control of Anjouan but were forced back. Twenty to thirty Federal troops were killed and a hundred were captured. Several independent militias seized their weapons. In early December 1998, 60 people were killed, thousands were displaced, and property was looted and destroyed after an assassination attempt against Founndi. Witnesses reported summary execution of civilians. Later in December, a cease-fire was signed as a precursor to talks, initially to be coordinated by South Africa.

The OAU mediated the Antananarivo Agreement in April 1999, which would create a loose federal structure for the three islands, to be called the Union of Comoran Islands. Representatives of Anjouan failed to sign the agreement. Subsequently, there were violent attacks against Anjouans living in the capital, Morani, on Grand Comore. As a result, there was a coup by Army Chief of Staff Col. Assoumani Azzali, who dissolved the constitution and declared a transitional government. Azzali has said that there will be presidential elections in April 2000.

Beginning February 2000, the OAU will gradually impose travel and financial sanctions on the Anjouan leadership in response to its failure to honor a July 1999 commitment to sign the Antananarivo Agreement. In January, an Anjouan referendum rejected joining the federation by almost 95%. Some residents have complained of widespread voting irregularities.

GA Res 53/1 F (11/16/98).

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries:

Enrique Bernales Ballesteros: E/CN.4/1998/31.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Waly Bacre Ndiaye: E/CN.4/1998/68 & Add.1.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Abdelfattah Amor: E/CN.4/2000/65.

The situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC - formerly Zaire) is a civil war with international aspects and a current international war (Uganda/Rwanda) fought in the territory of the DRC.

In October 1996, Zairean "Banyamulenge" rebels led by Laurent Kabila launched an offensive against the government and quickly captured large sections of the country. Mainly comprised of Tutsis who had lived in the area for hundreds of years, they revolted when local officials attempted to engineer their expulsion at the behest of Rwandan and Burundian Hutu rebel groups based in the country. The rebels, called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ADFL), overthrew the 30-year government of President Mobutu Sese Seko on May 17, 1997.

Kabila’s forces emptied the rebel Hutu-controlled Rwandan refugee camps on the border and dislodged Burundian Hutu rebels with the assistance of the Rwandan government (see "Rwanda"). Kabila’s troops reportedly separated young men from the rest of refugees returning to Rwanda, and 8 massacre sites have been identified by UN field workers. In June 1998, a UN report claimed that Kabila’s forces and the Rwandan army were responsible for murdering thousands of Hutu. Soldiers from Angola and Uganda were also reported fighting alongside Kabila’s ADFL, ostensibly because Mobutu had harboured two groups of Ugandan rebels (see "Uganda") as well as UNITA forces (see "Angola").

Kabila renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the Congo, banned all political activity, and announced multi-party election in two years. Opposition political leaders, journalists and some human rights activists have been arrested.

In late June 1998, there was a clash with Bernard Mizele’s secessionist Bakango group. Then in August 1998, Tutsi rebel forces turned against Kabila and began a military drive in eastern Congo. There was a UN-brokered agreement made in Paris in the Fall of 1998, but military operations continued. Kabilia’s government is being supported militarily by Zimbabwe and Namibia. The rebel factions are backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Rebels from Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and Uganda continue to operate out of Congolese territory. As many as 30,000 foreign troops are stationed in the country.

The Lusaka Peace Accord was signed in August 1999 by Kabila and his allies, as well as all the main rebel factions. Under its terms, foreign soldiers and rebel militias such as the Burundian CNDD-FDD and Rwandan Interahamwe are supposed to be disarmed, and democratic elections are to be held within three years. There had been no agreement on an outside facilitator, a venue, or an agenda for peace talks by the end of the year.

Emile Ilunga, president of the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) complained to the UN in October 1999 about violations of human rights by Kabila, including anti-Tutsi violence, concentration camps, and summary executions of civilians. In February 2000, there were protests in rebel-held territory in the south-east over living conditions.

In November 1999, the Security Council established MONUC with a plan to send 3,400 peacekeepers and 500 military observers to monitor the Lusaka Accord. In its resolution 1291 of 2/24/00 the Security Council approved enlargement of MONUC to 5,537 military personnel with 500 observers. The Security Council expressed concerns raised by many observers of the situation in DRC about the illegal exploitation of the country’s natural resources (especially diamonds) by rebel and foreign troops.

In early June, renewed fighting broke out between Rwanda and Uganda, rather than between rebel factions and the central government. While initially these two countries had both supported the RCD, Uganda began to back the rival Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) headed by J.-P. Bemba and E. Wamba dia Wamba, formerly of the RCD. Following brief skirmishes in August 1999 and May 2000, the two began intense fighting in Kisangani several days before the planned June 8 pull-out. Uganda attacked Rwandan positions in Kisangani in actions that, according to UN Peacekeeper Col. Danilo Paivo, amounted to "genocide against the city." The cathedral, hospitals and schools were shelled. A truce to have taken effect on 8 June 2000 was ignored, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan was in telephonic communication with Rwandan president Paul Kagame and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni. Several days later, Rwandan troops drove back the Ugandan forces, and UN forces were able to establish themselves in between the two. The Secretary-General has called on all outsiders to leave the DRC..

Called "Africa’s World War," the fighting has been said to have resulted in 1.7 million casualties in 22 months (not counting casualties from the latest fighting): 700,000 direct war casualties and 1 million from war-related disease and hunger. An estimated 600,000 people were displaced by the fighting before the latest attacks in Kisangani.

MONUC (11/99-present).

SC Res 1291 (2/24/2000). SC Res 1279 (11/30/99).

SC Res 1273 (11/5/99). SC Res 1258 (8/6/99).

SC Res 1234 (4/9/99). SC Res 1097 (2/18/97).

GA Res 54/260 (4/7/2000).

GA Res 54/179 (12/17/99). GA Res 54/96B (12/8/99).

GA Res 53/160 (12/9/98). GA Res 52/169A (12/16/97).

Comm Res 2000/15.

Comm Res 1999/56. Comm Res 1998/61.

Comm Res 1997/58. Comm Res 1996/77.

Rpt S-G (S/2000/30).

Rpt S-G (S/2000/330). Rpt S-G (S/1999/790).

Notes by Secretariat:

E/CN.4/1999/30; E/CN.4/2000/43.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur:

Roberto Garreton: E/CN.4/1996/66; E/CN.4/1997/6 & Add.1,2; E/CN.4/1999/31.

Report of Joint Mission (R. Garreton and W.B. N’diaye): E/CN.4/1998/64.

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1996/38; E/CN.4/1997/34; E/CN.4/1999/62; E/CN.4/2000/64.

Reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1996/40/Add.1; E/CN.4/1997/4/Add.1; Dec No. 7/1996.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel S. Rodley: E/CN.4/1996/35 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1997/7 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1999/61; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1996/4; E/CN.4/1997/60/Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add. 1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries:

Enrique Bernales Ballesteros: E/CN.4/1998/31.

Report of Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression:

Abid Hussain: E/CN.4/1999/64: E/CN.4/2000/63.

Note by Secretariat on Violations of Rights of Human Rights Defenders:

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/4.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers:

Param Cumaraswamy: E/CN.4/2000/61.

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict:

Olara Otunnu: E/CN.4/2000/71.

The situation in the Republic of Congo is a civil war with international dimensions.

In 1992, Pascal Lissouba was elected president of the Republic of Congo in the first democratic vote in that country, replacing Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who stepped down. Due to accusations of voting irregularities, a rival government and civil disobedience campaign was initiated by Brazzaville mayor Bernard Kolelas. A cycle of violence between the two leaders’ rival militias continued into 1994, leaving over 2000 dead. Tensions rose again during the spring of 1997 as the country prepared for new election scheduled for July, 1997 and Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso vied for control of Brazzaville.

A civil war broke out in June 1997 when the Army of the Republic of Congo attacked the Brazzaville residence of former president Sassou-Nguesso, claiming to be searching for arms. Rebel forces backing Sassou-Nguesso (the Cobra militia, reportedly supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola) seized Brazzaville in mid-October 1997, and several days later seized Pointe-Noire, the second-largest city and economic capital. Lissouba and Kolelas fled, and Sasso-Nguesso gained control of the government, announcing a three-year transition period leading to new presidental elections. A forum on unity and reconciliation took place in January 1998. Lissouba has been accused of genocide of the Bangali in 1997 and the Lari-Kongo in 1993-94.

A reported 1000-3000 Angolan soldiers fought with Sassou-Nguesso in an effort to dislodge UNITA rebels who had set up operations in Brazzaville following the fall of Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire (see "Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "Angola"). Both sides reportedly used mercenaries from Europe and South Africa. There was also reported behind-the-scenes backing from France for Sassou-Nguesso, as Lissouba had broken the monopoly of Elf-Aquitaine over oil production.

Kolelas and Lissouba’s militias resumed fighting in December 1998. There was heavy fighting in the Pool region as the government sealed off the area and bombarded it. An estimated 6000 were killed, mostly civilians. With Angolan backing the government launched a major offensive in May 1999 and claimed to capture all rebel bases in the center of the country.

Medecins Sans Frontieres accused both sides of perpetrating "blind and massive violence" against civilians, reporting that 250,000 refugees in the Pool region have been subject to summary executions, looting, and rape. Refugees claim that they were unable to return to Brazzaville sooner because they were prevented from leaving the Pool region by the rebels.

The government and rebel representatives signed the Pointe Noire truce in November 1999. A second peace accord, designed to consolidate the first agreement, was signed on December 29 by the government and five representatives of the rebel forces, with President Omar Bongo of Gabon acting as mediator. A general amnesty took effect on January 15, 2000 for rebels who would disarm and surrender. Thousands of rebels are reported to have taken part. Kolelas and Lissouba, currently in exile, are not included in the amnesty. In February, Kolelas said that he recognized the government of Sassou-Nguesso and supports the cease-fire.

Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced, an estimated 10,000 have died and 13,000 refugees from the fighting are staying in the northwest.

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/2000/30).

Statement, Pres SC (S/PRST/1997/47)(10/16/97).

Statement, Pres SC (S/PRST/1997/[ ])(10/29/97).

Sub-Comm Res 1999/1. Sub-Comm Res 1997/1.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel Rodley: E/CN.4/1998/38 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1998/43.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

Bacre Waly Ndiaye: E/CN.4/1998/68 & Add.1.

The situation in Cyprus is a war of national liberation in exercise of the right to self-determination.

Serious strife began in 1963 over fears that the island would be joined with Greece. Then, in 1974, the Turkish Army invaded and thousands of Greek-Cypriot prisoners disappeared. Of a pre-1974 population of 200,000, 500 Greek Cypriots remain in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. Their loss of property, now occupied by Turkish settlers, has never been compensated. Since the invasion, a buffer zone dividing the island into Greek and Turkish halves has been patrolled by UN peacekeepers.

The Turks declared a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, which is not recognized by any state except Turkey. The Security Council, in resolution 550 (1984), "reiterated its call upon all states not to recognize the purported state of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus set up by secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist aforesaid secessionist entity." In 1994 the European Court of Justice declared that the only legitimate government in Cyprus is the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

In August 1996 Turkish forces shot and killed 2 demonstrators (Tasos Isaac and Solomos Spyrou Solomos) and wounded several UN Peacekeeping troops and a number of civilians in two separate incidents at the buffer zone. This was condemned in a statement of the UN Sub-Commission in August 1996.

Two rounds of direct talks took place under UN sponsorship during the Summer of 1997, but TRNC leader Rauf Denktash withdrew after the European Union and the Cypriot government began accession talks. Turkey’s official acceptance as a candidate for EU membership smoothed the way for discussions to resume in December 1999. A third round is expected in June 2000. The UN favors a peace plan based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Denkash, however, wants recognition of the TRNC and a confederation between two sovereign states.

In December 1998, the UN Security Council passed two resolutions calling for a reduction in military spending and the removal of military forces of the government of Turkey. At the end of January 1999, Cyprus decided against deployment of long-range missiles and is now considering purchasing short-range missiles that would not be capable of reaching the air space of Turkey.

A 1999 resolution by the Security Council, extending the mandate of the peacekeeping force, requires, for the first time, the approval of both the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC. The TRNC now claims that by requiring their consent to the deployment, the UN has recognized their sovereignty. The UN denies this assertion.

Turkey currently maintains more than 30,000 troops in the north and still occupies about 37% of Cyprus. There are 1230 UN peacekeepers on the island. The fate of the disappeared is still unknown.

UNFICYP (3/64-present).

Comm on Missing Persons in Cyprus.

SC Res 1283 (12/15/99).

SC Res 1251 (6/29/99). SC Res 1250 (6/29/99).

SC Res 1218 (12/22/98). SC Res 1217 (12/22/98).

SC Res 1179 (6/29/98). SC Res 1178 (6/29/98).

SC Res 1146 (12/23/97). SC Res 1117 (6/27/97).

SC Res 1092 (12/23/96). SC Res 1062 (6/28/96).

SC Res 1032 (12/19/95). SC Res 1000 (6/23/95).

SC Res 969 (12/21/94). SC Res 939 (7/29/94).

SC Res 927 (6/15/94). SC Res 902 (3/11/94).

SC Res 889 (12/15/93). SC Res 839 (6/11/93).

SC Res 831 (5/27/93). SC Res 796 (12/14/92).

SC Res 789 (11/25/92). SC Res 774 (8/26/92).

SC Res 759 (6/12/92). SC Res 716 (10/11/91).

SC Res 682 (12/21/90). SC Res 680 (12/14/90).

SC Res 657 (6/15/90). SC Res 649 (3/12/90).

SC Res 646 (12/14/89). SC Res 634 (6/9/89).

SC Res 625 (12/15/88). SC Res 614 (6/15/88).

GA Res 46/474 (9/14/92). GA Res 37/181 (12/17/82).

GA Res 32/128 (12/16/77). GA Res 3450 (XXX) (12/9/75).

GA Res 3212 (XXIX) (11/1/74).

Comm Dec. 2000/103.

Comm Dec. 1999/103. Comm Dec 1998/109.

Comm Dec. 1995/113. Comm Dec. 1994/110.

Comm Dec. 1993/109. Comm Dec. 1993/109.

Comm Dec. 1992/106. Comm Dec. 1991/106.

Comm Res 1987/50. Comm Res 4 (XXXI) (1975).

Sub-Comm Res 1987/19. Sub-Comm Res 1 (XXIII) (1975).

Rpt S-G (S/2000/496). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/2000/90).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/2000/26). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1999/25).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/1203 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/1999/707).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/657). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1998/55).

Rpt S-G (S/1998/518). Rpt S-G (S/1998/488).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/973). Rpt S-G (S/1997/962).

Rpt S-G (S/1997/437). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1997/48).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/54). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1995/69).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/1407). Rpt S-G (S/1994/1229).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/680 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/1994/380).

Rpt S-G (S/1994/262). Rpt S-G (S/26777 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (A/49/758). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1994/46).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1992/5). Rpt S-G (S/26438).

Rpt S-G (S/26026). Rpt S-G (S/25912 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (S/25492). Rpt S-G (S/21183).

Rpt S-G (S/23780). Rpt S-G (S/24472).

Rpt S-G (S/24830). Rpt S-G (S/24050).

Rpt S-G (S/21340 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/21393).

Rpt S-G (S/21932). Rpt S-G (S/21981 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (S/20663 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/21010 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (S/19927 & Add.1). Rpt S-G (S/18880 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (S/19304 & Add.1).

Report of the Secretariat Review Team on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (S/21982).

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel S. Rodley: E/CN.4/1995/34; E/CN.4/1997/7 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Abdelfattah Amor: E/CN.4/1995/91; E/CN.4/1997/91; E/CN.4/2000/65.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of Racism:

Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo: E/CN.4/1999/15; E/CN.4/2000/16.

Report of the UNHCHR on Human Rights and Mass Exoduses:

E/CN.4/2000/81.

The situation in East Timor is a war of national liberation in exercise of the right to self-determination with a recent referendum on independence.

East Timor was a Portuguese colony for over 300 years. In 1975, as Portugal was preparing to grant independence to the territory, the Indonesian army mounted an invasion, annexed East Timor (in 1976), and has occupied the territory ever since. The UN has never recognized Indonesia’s claim of sovereignty. Indonesia has waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign of political imprisonment, arbitrary arrest, murder and rape against the resistance movement. During the occupation, up to 200,000 Timorese (approximately one-third of the population) died of disease, starvation, or were murdered.

In November 1991, soldiers fired on a peaceful demonstration of approximately 2000 in the Santa Cruz cemetery of Dili. Up to 270 people may have died and another 200 have "disappeared." There is evidence that some of the wounded taken to a military hospital were deliberately killed. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions found reasons to believe that the killings were a planned military operation. Ten low-ranking members of the security forces were charged with disobeying orders and one with assault or cutting off of the ears of a demonstrator, while six senior officers were found guilty of misconduct. Although no officers were charged with serious assault or murder, thirteen civilians participating in the protest were sentenced to terms up to life imprisonment. There are also credible reports of forced or involuntary sterilizations of Timorese girls and women by Indonesian authorities.

The government arrested the resistance’s top leader, Jose (Xanana) Gusmao, in 1992, and the second in command, M ‘Huno da Costa Gomes, in April, 1993. On May 21, 1993, in a highly criticized trial, Xanana was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1995, Carmel Budiardjo won the Right Livelihood prize for her work on East Timor. Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, East Timor’s Archbishop, and Jose Ramos Horta, an exiled Timorese leader, were awarded the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize "for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict."

During 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated three rounds of talks between Indonesia and Portugal in the hopes of creating new progress towards a settlement. Nelson Mandela had been continuously requesting Soeharto to release Xanana since Mandela’s visit to Xanana in July, 1997. The Secretary-General also named Jamshal Marker as UN Mediator.

Indonesian President Soeharto resigned in May 1998 and his successor B.J. Habibie promised the release of Timorese political prisoners. Some were released throughout the remainder of 1998. Xanana was finally moved from prison to house arrest in February 1999 and released in September 1999.

On January 27, 1999, the Indonesian government announced it would consider giving East Timor its independence if its proposal for "special autonomy" were rejected. In the days before the August 30, 1999 referendum, anti-independence militias staged intimidation campaigns, carrying machetes and automatic weapons around neighborhoods, and firebombing the office of the National Council of Timorese Resistence in Lospalos. Nevertheless, the vote resulted in a landslide victory for independence supporters.

After the result was announced on September 4, 1999 there was widespread violence and killing. The Indonesian military originally denied responsibility, but separate Indonesian and UN investigations have since accused the army and senior minister General Wiranto, who led the armed forces at the time of the vote, of supporting the anti-independence militias. 750,000 East Timorese (out of a population of less than 900,000) were displaced by the fighting, and the capital, Dili, was nearly destroyed.

In September, 1999 Habibie agreed to allow UN peacekeepers, and in October he turned over authority for East Timor to the UN. On October 20, 1999, Indonesia’s legislature voted to renounce all claims to East Timor. The UN Mission (UNAMET), has military, police, governance, and humanitarian components and is expected to remain two to three years until a Timorese government is elected.

ECOSOC has set up a team to investigate violence in the region between January 1999, when the decision to allow the referendum was made, through the post-election violence. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that there was "overwhelming evidence that East Timor has seen a deliberate, vicious and systematic campaign of gross violations of human rights." UN officials have found evidence of wide-spread murder, rape, and torture. Several sites of mass graves have been found, and more than 300 people were killed during the violence, including a massacre of 56 men found buried in the town of Passabe, and up to another ten more buried nearby in West Timor. Passabe is in the Oecussi enclave, surrounded on three sides by Indonesian-controlled West Timor.

Hundreds of thousands of people fled to West Timor, have been living in camps, and have been intimidated from returning by militia members. They are slowly returning to East Timor. Inadequate sanitation and medical supplies in the camps have resulted in the deaths of at least 500 people, many of them infants.

UNTAET (10/99-present).

SC Res 1272 (10/25/99). SC Res 1264 (9/15/99).

SC Res 1262 (8/27/99). SC Res 1258 (8/3/99).

SC Res 1246 (6/11/99). SC Res 1236 (5/7/99).

SC Res 389 (4/22/76). SC Res 384 (12/22/75).

GA Res 54/246B (4/7/2000). GA Res 54/24A (12/23/99).

GA Res 54/194 (12/17/99). GA Res 54/20B (4/7/2000).

GA Res 54/96H (12/15/99). GA Res 54/20A (10/29/99).

GA Res 37/30 (11/23/82). GA Res 1541 (XV) (12/15/60).

GA Res 1514 (XV) (12/14/60).

Comm Res 1999/S-4/1. Comm Res 1997/63.

Comm Res 1993/97. Comm Res 1992/84.

Comm Res 1983/8.

Sub-Comm Doc E/CN.4/1995/L.7.

Sub-Comm Res 1993/12. Sub-Comm Res 1992/20.

Sub-Comm Res 1990/15. Sub-Comm Res 1989/7.

Sub-Comm Res 1987/13. Sub-Comm Res 1984/24.

Sub-Comm Res 1983/26. Sub-Comm Res 1982/20.

Rpt S-G (S/2000/53 & Add.1,2). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/2000/115).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1999/28). Rpt S-G (S/1999/862).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/803). Rpt S-G (S/1999/705).

Rpt S-G (S/1999/595). Rpt S-G (S/1999/513).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1998/58). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1997/51 & Add.1).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1996/56). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1995/72).

Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1994/61). Rpt S-G (E/CN.4/1993/49).

Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:

E/CN.4/1996/112; E/CN.4/2000/27.

Notes by Secretariat:

E/CN.4/2000/44; E/CN.4/2000/45.

Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

Reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1994/27; E/CN.4/1995/31 & Add.2; E/CN.4/1996/40/Add.1;

E/CN.4/1997/4/Add.1, Dec.No. 36/1996; E/CN.4/1999/63 & Add.1; E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.2; E/CN.4/2000/4 & Add.1.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture:

P. Kooijmans: E/CN.4/1990/17; E/CN.4/1991/17; E/CN.4/1992/17 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1993/26.

Nigel S. Rodley: E/CN.4/1994/31; E/CN.4/1995/34; E/CN.4/1996/35 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1997/7 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1999/61; E/CN.4/2000/9.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:

S. Amos Wako: E/CN.4/1990/22; E/CN.4/1991/36; E/CN.4/1992/30.

Bacre Waly N’diaye: E/CN.4/1993/46; E/CN.4/1994/7; E/CN.4/1995/61 & Add.1; E/CN.4/1996/4; E/CN.4/1998/68 & Add.1.

Asma Jahangir: E/CN.4/1999/39 & Add. 1; E/CN.4/2000/3 & Add.1.

Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Angelo Vidal d’Almeida: E/CN.4/1991/56; E/CN.4/1992/52; E/CN.4/1993/62 & Corr.1.

Abdelfattah Amor: E/CN.4/1995/91/Add.1; E/CN.4/1997/91; E/CN.4/2000/65.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women:

Radhika Coomaraswamy: E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3; E/CN.4/2000/68.

Note by Secretariat on Violations of Rights of Human Rights Defenders:

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/4 & Add.2.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of Racism:

Maurice Glélé-Ahanhanzo: E/CN.4/2000/16.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers:

Param Cumaraswamy: E/CN.4/2000/61.

Report of Representative of S-G on IDPs:

Francis Deng: E/CN.4/2000/83.

The situation in Eritrea is an international armed conflict with Ethiopia.

Eritrea and Ethiopia were ruled by an Italian colonial government beginning in 1889, then by a British military administration from 1941 – 1952. They then formed a federation, but due to a gradual reduction in autonomy for Eritrea, war broke out in 1961. The conflict ended in 1991 with Eritrea’s independence. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean leader Isaias Afwerki, former friends in the struggle again Ethiopia’s former ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam began small skirmishes, the most pronounced when Eritrea introduced its own currency in 1997 over the objections of Ethiopia.

On May 13, 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia began fighting over disputed border regions. The Ethiopian government accused Eritrea of occupying areas in the northwest and Eritrea said it was reacting to border violations of Ethiopia on May 6, 1998. High intensity fighting ebbed in June 1998 after thousands were killed, but frequent shelling continued.

Severe fighting began again on February 6, 1999, after seven months of international diplomacy, especially on the part of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), failed to resolve the conflict. Most observers blame Eritrea for rejecting the OAU plan, the only proposal on the table. Air strikes resumed in breach of a June 1998 moratorium. Fighting in February and March 1999 resulted in up to 60,000 killed.

Fighting continued sporadically for the remainder of 1999, with Ethiopia regaining some territory. Then intense fighting broke out in April and May 2000, with Ethiopia making substantial military gains. Both sides apparently concur that this renewed fighting has cost tens of thousands of new military casualties. On June 9, 2000, Eritrea accepted a new OAU peace plan (although the plan is nearly identical to the earlier plan) worked out in Algiers, subsequently approved by Ethiopia. Under this plan, signed June 18, 2000 in Algiers, both sides would retreat to positions held on May 6, 1998, and UN forces would monitor a 15-mile-wide buffer zone on Eritrean border territory while UN mediators worked out a boundary (line of demarcation) between the two countries.

Both sides accuse each other of forcibly deporting each other’s nationals. There are an estimated 600,000 refugees from the fighting, including 150,000 Eritreans living in temporary camps along the Ethiopian border with little shelter. Almost 70,000 Eritreans were illegally expelled by Ethiopia after their property was confiscated, including nationals who are of Eritrean origin.

Several Somali factions have accused Eritrea and Ethiopia of arming them to fight against each other. Somali groups have also accused Eritrea of training Ethiopian rebel groups in southern Somalia.

SC Res 1298 (5/17/2000). SC Res 1297 (5/12/2000).

SC Res 1227 (2/10/99). SC Res 1226 (1/29/99).

SC Res 1177 (6/26/98). SC Res 1227.

Rpt S-G (S/2000/530).

Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:

E/CN.4/1999/63 & Add.1.

Report of Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances:

E/CN.4/1999/62; E/CN.4/2000/64.

Report of Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance:

Abdelfattah Amor: E/CN.4/2000/65.

Report of Special Rapporteur on Torture:

Nigel Rodley: E/CN.4/2000/9.

The situation in Ethiopia is an international armed conflict with Eritrea.

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